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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the combination of institutional factors and tech-
nology advances as determinants for the choice of payment instruments. The theoretical set up 
suggests that countries that enter into a new institutional environment adopt the attitudes of the 
accepting group towards the payment choices as a consequence of institutional pressure and tech-
nology development. We apply the results of the model to the European Union enlargement process 
of 2004. Our findings confirm the relevance of both institutional environment and technology de-
velopment in retail payment choice decisions particular to Central and Eastern European Countries.
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Introduction
Continuous evolution of information technologies has led to a significant transformation 
of the payment industry (Evans, Schmalensse 2009). A well-designed payment infrastruc-
ture is important for the proper functioning of markets and helps in eliminating frictions 
in trade. Reliable and safe payment mechanisms for the transfer of funds are the condi-
tion sine qua non for the majority of economic interactions (ECB 2010). The degree of 
technology development is a key element in consumer decision to move from cash or 
paper to electronic means of payment as well. Previous papers (Ireland 1994b; Marquis, 
Reffett 1994; English 1999; Hromcová 2008) relate the choice of payment instruments to 
the technological progress. Empirically, Humphrey et al. (1996) find that the availability 
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of new payment methods, the existence of a corresponding technology at the disposal of 
consumers, explains part of the differences found in payment use in a group of developed 
countries. Markose and Loke (2003) show that the decrease in the use of cash and its sub-
stitution by cards is affected by the availability of payment terminals at the point of sale. 
Hayashi and Klee (2003) and Anguelov et al. (2004) show that general technology adoption 
by consumers is positively related to the use of electronic payments. Similarly, Snellman 
and Virén (2009), Ferrari et al. (2010) and Yang and Ching (2013) have offered evidence 
on the impact that automatic teller machine (ATM) networks have in consumers’ decisions. 
Further, Humphrey et al. (2006) and Hasan et al. (2012) found that the development in the 
use of electronic retail payment instruments is related to notable improvements in banking 
performance. In addition, Hasan et al. (2013) show that the migration to electronic retail 
payments spurs overall economic development. Therefore, countries might be interested in 
technology adoption as part of their economic progress. 
Development of new payment technologies does not imply the elimination of tradition-
al methods. Consumers ultimately determine which of these instruments they actually use. 
Once consumers and merchants get comfortable with a particular technology, they need a 
compelling reason to switch to another one. First of all, for a new method of payment to 
be successful, it must attract substantial number of users, offer significant cost savings or 
add convenience relative to the existing payment instruments. Second, whatever its cost 
or convenience, a payment method must be trustworthy and secure, otherwise people will 
not use it (Litan, Baily 2009). The existence of a sound and reliable institutional environ-
ment could clearly help consumers’ perception of security and convenience. National and 
supranational regulations can provide additional incentives to users and thereby accelerate 
the acceptance of a particular payment instrument. La Porta et al. (1997) show the role of 
the institutional environment and national regulations in shaping financial market design 
that could also influence the retail payment choice development. In fact, the work on the 
minimal institutional requirements imposed on payment methods, by the Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems, is considered to serve as a guideline (BIS 2005). To the 
best of our knowledge the combination of institutional factors and technology advances 
has not been analyzed together as possible determinants of payment choice.
This paper tries to fill this gap by focusing on institutional and technological character-
istics both from a theoretical and empirical point of view. In particular, the paper analyzes 
how the process of entering an economic and monetary union could shape the evolution of 
consumers’ payments in newly acceded countries. It considers the role of new institutions 
together with the technology advances derived from that integration. The conclusions of 
the theoretical analysis are then tested on the particular case of European Union (EU) en-
largement to Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)1. This context is particularly 
challenging because the enlargement process has proven to be successful in providing in-
stitutions’ building and structural transformation for CEECs (Dabrowski, Radziwill 2007). 
On May 1st, 2004 the EU welcomed ten more countries as a part of its largest enlargement 
ever. The accession of the new members increased the EU population by nearly 20% but 
1 Note that the OECD definition of CEECs slightly differs from the group of countries used here. We replace Albania 
and Croatia by Cyprus and Malta, but the core of the members is unchanged. 
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the EU’s total gross domestic product (GDP) increased just by 4% (Hildebrandt 2002)2. The 
CEECs integration negotiations required the implementation of the acquis communautaire, 
the set of laws that underpin the common market, by EU accession. In other words, CEECs 
financial sectors were expected to be transformed to such an extent that the supervisory 
and legal framework reached more or less EU standards in order to grant membership. 
Moreover, EU financial sector has also been experiencing a profound change -deregulation, 
disintermediation, technological change and single currency-representing, in fact a moving 
target to the CEECs authorities (Stirbu 2004).
In light of the above discussion, the first objective of the paper is to develop a theoreti-
cal model. We want to describe the effects that, in terms of the existence of technology 
advances, the accession to an economic and monetary union can have on household pay-
ment choice. We assume that consumers have two ways of acquiring consumption goods, 
cash and electronic payments. Technology is crucial for the development of the payment 
context. We introduce payment characteristics from Hromcová (2008) into the model of 
Ireland (1994a). In a resulting setup, knowledge improvement leads to more sophisticated 
payment environment and cheaper electronic transactions. In the process of accession, the 
less developed economy (accessing country) gradually adapts to the payment standards 
of the more developed economy (accepting country). As a consequence, agents’ payment 
choice approaches the one of the consumers in the more developed country. The second 
objective of the paper is to estimate the results of the model. For that, we use data on 
EU payment choice for the candidate countries to access EU in 2004. Furthermore, data 
availability allows us to study the joint effect of institutional environment and technology 
development on payment decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 explains the institutional trans-
formation to EU integration. Section 2 describes the theoretical model. Section 3 presents 
the empirical analysis. Finally, we conclude.
1. Institutional transition towards EU accession 
In May 2004, ten new states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia) become members of the EU. For eight of these coun-
tries, membership is the culmination of a decade-long transition from central planning 
to market economies. The fall of Communism in Europe creates an opportunity to end 
the historical East-West division in Europe associated with the Cold War. The European 
Economic Community (European Union from 1993) starts to sign comprehensive Europe 
Association Agreements with CEECs in 1991. The European integration is the strategic 
direction from day one of transition (Dabrowski, Radziwill 2007). Three different stages in 
the EU integration process are defined: associate, applicant and negotiating. The strategy of 
linking reforms to integration stage (see Fig. 1) allows EU to monitor effectively the com-
prehensive process of institutional quality improvements and intensify structural reforms 
to satisfy all the conditions for membership. 
2 Including Romania and Bulgaria that entered in 2007.
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Specifically, EU membership means embracing the Union’s political, economic and 
social values such as democracy, rule of law, competitive and open markets, and social 
cohesion. Second, it implies structural reforms in economic sectors. In the financial area 
the requirements are to fully liberalize the capital movements to adopt the EU regulatory 
norms and prudential rules. This includes, for example, the implementation of central bank 
independence, legislation on the free movement of capital and freedom of payments, the 
provision of banking, securities trade and investment services, collateral rules, and legisla-
tion aiming at an internal market for financial services. For instance, the Financial Services 
Action Plan (ECB 2002) is the driving force and the key instrument for bulging an efficient 
financial system and financial convergence with the EU (Stirbu 2004). The effort made 
by CEECs to satisfy membership conditions in this respect has been immense. Financial 
system reforms started in the early 1990s to transform the public banking sector inherited 
from the communist system. However, the banking crises that were suffered during this 
transition process slowed down the reforms (Tang et al. 2000). We find CEECs at the initial 
stage of evolution and growth in 1999.
Before accession, the financial systems of the CEECs had three main characteristics. 
First, there was a strong dominance of the banking sector and capital markets were not 
usually used as a source of finance. Second, the level of financial intermediation remained 
relatively low, even in those countries with the most developed financial markets, Czech Re-
public, Hungary and Poland (ECB 2002). The relation of banking assets to the economies’ 
GDP amounted to about one-quarter of the corresponding figure for the euro area in 2001 
(Caviglia et al. 2002). Further, in the liabilities side, deposits represented one third of those 
in the euro area as a share of GDP (Caviglia et al. 2002). Finally there was a strong presence 
of foreign ownership in the domestic banking sector (Caviglia et al. 2002; Stirbu 2004). 
Foreign investors were said to help bringing capital and know-how, strengthening compe-
tition and contributing to the successful restructuring process (Thimann 2002). However, 
in addition to the low financial intermediation stated above, many of the foreign-owned 
banks used to move key activities to the headquarters, so that subsidiaries in the acces-
Fig. 1. Timetable of EU integration process of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)
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sion countries lose some of their important functions (Thimann 2002). In these settings, 
the EU accession is viewed as an important structural change for the banking sector by 
the CEECs central banks (Thimann 2002). Unsurprisingly, there is evidence of an increase 
in competition in the banking system due mainly to the process of European Integration 
(Andrieş, Capraru 2012).
With respect to the payment methods, cash was most widely used. The average per-
centage of cash in circulation with respect to M1 was more than three times the one for 
the EU in 2003 (Callado, Utrero 2004). Moreover, the use of payment cards was increasing 
along the integration period (applicant and negotiating status) together with the number 
of ATM and electronic funds transfer at the point of sale (EFTPOS) terminals. The rise of 
ATM and EFTPOS continued at a faster pace when membership occurred, especially in the 
case of the latter (see Fig. 2)3. All together, this evidence suggests a positive and continuous 
development of payment methods along the integration period and a relevant effect of EU 
accession in payment evolution.
2. Theoretical model
We consider two economies that differ in the initial level of development. At the beginning 
they are two separated countries and can have different monetary policies. With the acces-
sion moment approaching, their monetary policies must converge and at the moment of 
3 Average annual increase of ATM and EFTPOS during 2004–2009 compared with 1996–2003 was 67% and 145% 
higher, respectively.
Fig. 2. ATM and EFTPOS evolution (number of facilities per 1 million inhabitants)
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accession a common monetary policy applies in both economies. After the unification takes 
place, the accessing country gradually adopts the payment technology of the more devel-
oped one. They both maintain their own structure and other variables unchanged. Tech-
nology level is crucial for the payment environment. The higher the technology achieved, 
the cheaper the non-cash payments. As a measure of technology, we use the level of capi-
tal in the sense of the learning-by-doing model (Barro, Sala-i-Martin 1995). Because the 
learning-by-doing model can be reduced to an AK model, for simplicity of our theoretical 
setup, we assume that the production function has the linear form. However, we keep 
reminding the reader that the level of capital is the measure of achieved knowledge, and 
higher knowledge leads to higher technological level.
In the description of the model we follow closely Ireland (1994a) and Hromcová (2008). 
The behavior of households in both countries is analogous. Therefore, we present the model 
for the economy that begins with lower level of technology and at the end of the section 
we generalize the model for the other country.
2.1. Accessing country
2.1.1. Household problem
The economy consists of a large number of infinitely lived households. All households have 
identical preferences, production and trade opportunities. Households inhabit the follow-
ing environment: they face continuum of spatially separated markets, which are indexed by 
j∈[0,1]. All households live in market 0, and the index j indicates the distance from home. 
In each market j a distinct perishable good is produced and sold in every period. Goods 
are thus indexed by j, which corresponds to the market of both production and trade. The 
representative household has the preferences given by:
 
( )
∞
=
 β  ∑ ∫
1
0 0
,t t
t
u c j dj  (1)
where β is the discount factor, ct(j) is defined as the consumption at period t of the good 
produced in market j, u(⋅) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously 
differentiable, with ( )→∞   = ∞ lim ' .t tu c j
The production and trade is like in Lucas and Stokey (1983). Each household is com-
posed of a worker-shopper pair. Prior to any trading, central bank fixes the level of the 
gross nominal interest rate Rt+1 between periods t and t +1. We will assume that Rt+1 > 1. 
Agents enter the period t with certain amount of monetary balances Zt and the debt Bt, 
carried over from the previous period, and the capital stock kt that represents the technol-
ogy level achieved. A representative worker decides to produce on any of the markets j via 
the net production function:
 yt =Akt , (2)
where A is the net productivity of capital4.
4 Thanks to the AK technology, we can write the net production function as yt = (A′ + 1 – δ) kt. It corresponds to 
the one defined in the equation (2), where A′ is the marginal productivity and δ is the depreciation of capital.
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First, the goods market opens and consumption takes place. Worker stays at the market 
j during the whole period. Shopper visits various markets to acquire consumption goods 
carrying all the monetary balances of the household. Two ways of acquiring consumption 
goods are allowed: using money or electronic payments. All goods purchased with money 
will be referred to as cash goods. Goods purchased via electronic payments will be referred 
to as electronic goods. Nominal monetary balances Zt can be used to buy goods in some of 
the markets indexed by j. Cash purchases are subject to the liquidity constraint:
  ( ) ( ) − ξ ≤ ∫
1
0
1 ,tt t
t
Z
j c j dj
p
 
 (3)
where ( )ξ = 0t j  if a good is purchased on market j with cash, or ( )ξ =1t j if a good is 
purchased on market j via an electronic payment and pt is the price level.
As said above, agents can use an electronic payment to pay for the consumption. The 
financial intermediary enables electronic payments at a cost ( )γt j  that is given for each 
market j and period t. The part of output that is not consumed is devoted to the invest-
ment into capital. After the goods market closes, the monetary holdings of agents are aug-
mented by a lump sum transfer Xt from the central bank. The amount Xt is endogenously 
determined in the system according to the given nominal interest rate, so that the money 
demand is totally satisfied. As the next step, the securities market opens. During the securi-
ties trading session households choose their currency holdings Zt+1. They also purchase (or 
issue) one-period nominally denominated pure discount bonds paying Bt+1 units of money 
at period t+1 while they cost +
+
1
1
t
t
B
R
 units of money at period t. Bonds are in zero net supply. 
The budget constraint agents are facing can be written:
 
( ) ( ) ( ) + ++
+
 + ξ γ + + + ≤ + + + ∫
1
1 1
1
10
.t t t t tt t t t t
t t t t t t
Z B Z B X
c j j j dj k Ak
p R p p p p
  (4)
2.1.2. Financial intermediation
We assume that the intermediation cost must be paid by the buyer, as motivated in Ireland 
(1994b). To be able to purchase without cash, some resources must be devoted to making 
the non-cash payment itself available such as checking the identity of the buyer or her 
ability to pay. When the shopper is far away from home (market zero) the communication 
becomes more difficult, and therefore we assume that the payment to the intermediary 
increases with j. The process of learning-by-doing grants a potential for the development of 
new technologies. It also leads to an increase in income per worker and higher consump-
tion. Higher purchase means that checking the ability of the buyer to pay is more relevant. 
The development and diffusion of new technologies drives down the processing costs.
The real payment made to the intermediary is characterized by a function that fulfills 
properties found in some empirical studies, as described in Hromcová (2008): the inter-
mediation cost is lower in richer countries, the cost of intermediated payment diminishes 
over time, and the cost elasticity is close to zero, i.e. the cost is proportional to consump-
tion purchase. We specify the intermediation cost function as a composition of three parts:
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) γ ⋅ = γ γ γ   .location technology consumptiont t tj k c j  (5)
The time independent part of the payment, ( )γlocation j  is strictly increasing with the 
distance from home, strictly convex, twice continuously differentiable, and similarly to 
Ireland (1994a)5 we assume:
 ( )γ = 0
location j  and ( )
→∞
γ = ∞lim .location
t
j   (6)
The function ( )γtechnology tk  is strictly decreasing, strictly convex, twice continuously 
differentiable and ( )
→∞
γ =lim 0.technology tt
k  The time dependent part of the intermediation 
cost,  ( )γtechnology tk , embodies the effect of new technologies on the cost. It includes the 
state of the technology frontier as well as the net of electronic infrastructures to perform 
the electronic payments. This cost decreases as the level of technology develops. The more 
capital is accumulated, the more knowledge is available, better technologies can be devel-
oped and cheaper intermediation services can be offered. The other time dependent part 
of the intermediation cost, ( ) γ  consumption tc j , is increasing, linear in consumption and 
( )γ =0 0.consumption
We thus concentrate directly on the effect of new technologies on the intermediation 
cost. However, the scale economies are also present, because higher stock of knowledge is 
associated with higher volume of transactions.
2.1.3. Payment choice
Consider a given level of kt. The cost of cash goods is the same in all markets and it 
corresponds to the nominal interest rate. The cost of electronic goods increases with the 
distance from home, taking into account the assumption on the time independent part 
of the intermediation cost ( )γ ⋅location , equation (6). Whenever + >1 1,tR there will exist at 
each time t an interval of markets where the intermediation cost for electronic purchases 
is lower than the nominal interest rate, and an interval where it is higher. Therefore, there 
will exist a market with cutoff index ( )∈ 0,1ts , such that in all markets with indexes < tj s  
consumers will use electronic payments and in all markets with indexes ≥ tj s  consumers 
will use cash to acquire consumption goods. Thus households will choose cash goods in 
markets far away from home (market 0) and electronic goods in markets close to home6.
In the cutoff market consumers are indifferent between using cash or electronic pay-
ments. We arbitrarily assume that cash will be used at the cutoff market. In our specifica-
tion the level of new knowledge increases over time. Changes in kt affect the payment to 
intermediary via ( )γtechnology tk . Therefore, technology development and interest rate are 
5 The combination of the term referring to location and technology reflects the convergence of, for example, lo-
cal and long distance phone call prices in recent years. Location term in the cost function guarantees the spatial 
separation of markets. It allows expressing exchange opportunities in communication. An equivalent modelling 
approach could be based on a characteristic reflecting agents’ openness or willingness to accept and use electronic 
payments. Such an alternative specification would not alter the conclusions of the model.
6 What is important here is that the consumer chooses the point of division on the continuum of markets. One 
could construct the model in a way that cash is employed in markets close to home and electronic payments in 
markets far away from home adapting the approach of Gillman (1993), for example. Such assumption would not 
change the conclusions of our model, however.
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factors that affect the cutoff index ts : an increase in the level of technology, + >1t tk k , 
implies lower intermediation cost and therefore, electronic payments will be employed in 
higher fraction of the markets, + >1t ts s ; an increase in the nominal interest rate, + >1t tR R , 
increases the opportunity cost of holding money, and cash will be employed in lower frac-
tion of the markets, + >1t ts s . 
Define
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
 ζ == 
ζ =
0
1
,    when     0,
,    when     1.
t t
t
t t
c j j
c j
c j j
The functions ( )0tc j  and ( )1tc j  characterize the cash and electronic consumption per 
market j, respectively.
2.1.4. Equilibrium
Definition: Given the set of initial conditions k1, Z1, B1, p1 and the sequence 
of nominal interest rates { }∞+ =1 0t tR , the equilibrium consists of sequences 
( ) ( ){ }∞+ + + + =0 1 1 1 1 1 1, , , , , , , ,t t t t t t t t tc j c j k Z B s X p  such that
(a) a representative household is maximizing the discounted utility (1) subject to the 
budget constraint (4) and the cash-in-advance constraint (3), choosing the sequenc-
es ( ) ( ){ }∞+ + + =0 1 1 1 1 1, , , , , ,t t t t t t tc j c j k Z B s
(b) markets for goods, money and bonds clear in every period7, 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) += + + γ +∫ ∫ ∫
1
0 1
1
0 0
,
t t
t
s s
t t t t t
s
Ak c j dj c j dj j dj k ; (7)
 + = +1 ,t t tZ Z X ;  (8)
 + =1 0.tB   (9)
Let lt and ht be the non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget con-
straint (4) and the cash-in-advance constraints (3), respectively. The equations that char-
acterize the equilibrium are the above mentioned market clearing conditions (7), (8), (9) 
and the first order conditions on consumption, capital, nominal balances, nominal bonds 
and cutoff index, respectively,
 
( )  = λ + η 0' ,t t tu c j ; (10)
 
( )  = λ 1' ,t tu c j ; (11)
 +λ = βλ 1 ,t t A; (12)
7 Notice that the conditions on the electronic payments correspond pretty closely with the credit card 
operations. When paying with electronic payments, consumer can keep the interest rate payment up 
to the point when money is transferred away from his account. In the model this happens at the end 
of each period. Thus the debit card payments will be quicker in reality, and the delayed credit card 
payments will be slower. 
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+ +
+
λ λ + η
=β 1 1
1
,t t t
t tp p
; (13)
 
+
+
+
λ λ
= β 11
1
,t tt
t t
R
p p
; (14)
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )     − = −λ + γ + λ + η     0 1 1 0 .t t t t t t t t t t t t tu c s u c s c s s c s  (15)
Using (10), (11), (13) and (14), we can rewrite the first order conditions on both con-
sumptions as follows:
 
( )  = λ 0' ,t t tu c j R ;  (16)
 
( )  = λ 1' .t tu c j  (17)
From the first order condition (15) we obtain the payment to the intermediary at the 
cutoff market:
 
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( )    γ = λ − λ + λ − λ     λ 1 0 0 1
1, , , .t t t t t t t t t t
t
s R k u c u c R R c R c
 
(18)
Taking into account the expressions (16), (17) and (5), the equilibrium on the goods 
market (7) can be rewritten as:
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
+= λ + λ + γ +∫ ∫ ∫
, ,1
0 1
1
, 0 0
, .
t t t t
t t
s R k s R k
t t t t t t
s R k
Ak c R dj c dj j dj k  (19)
The current period output is spent among cash consumption, electronic consumption, 
payment to the intermediary and investment. The real monetary balances, = ,tt
t
Z
m
p
 which 
equal the amount of cash consumption purchased in all markets, are:
 ( ) ( ) = − λ 
01 , , .t t t t tm s R k c R  (20)
The consumption via financial intermediaries, which equal the amount of electronic 
consumption purchased in all markets, is:
 ( ) ( )= λ
1, .t t t te s R k c  (21)
Thus the ratio of cash to electronic payments depends on the specification of the inter-
mediation function, the utility and the monetary policy in the previous period.
In order to see the behavior of the ratio of cash to electronic payments, we set up a 
parametric example with the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function:
 
−θ
−θ
θ =
=  −
θ ≠

1
1
ln             for     1,      and
( ) 1
     for     1
t
t t
c
u c c   (22)
where θ > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, and the fol-
lowing proportional intermediation cost:
 
( ) ( ) ( )γ = γ λ
−
1 .
1
technology
t t t
jj k c
j
 (23)
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We can then write the cutoff index combining (23) and (18) in the following form:
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
φ
=
γ + φ
, tt t technology
t t
R
s R k
k R
, (24)
where
 
( )
−θ
θ
θ =

 
φ =  θ − θ ≠  − θ  
 
1
ln                            for     1,
11      for     1.
1
t
t
t
R
R
R
 (25)
The cutoff index describes the proportion of markets in which agents employ services 
of the intermediary. From (12) we can get the evolution of the marginal utility of consump-
tion. We can see that its growth rate is constant over time. The ratio of cash to electronic 
consumptions can be expressed as
 
( )
( ) θ
γ
=
φ
1 .
technology
tt
t
t t
km
e
R R
 (26)
The technology level and the monetary policy affect the composition of the payment 
methods as follows (recall that we assumed that capital affects negatively the intermedia-
tion cost):
 
( )
< 0t t
t
d m e
dk
 and 
( )
< 0.t t
t
d m e
dR
  (27)
For this parametric example, it can be shown that in the long run, the output, capital 
and electronic consumption all grow at a rate ( )θβ
1
.A  The proof is provided in Appendix 1.
Notice also that the cutoff index ( ),t ts R k  converges to 1 as →∞tk  independently of 
the level of the interest rate, see equation (24). Thus the decreasing trend of the ratio of 
cash to electronic payments will be determined by the growth of technology. 
2.2. Accepting country
The specification of the accessing and accepting economy is the same. When writing the 
version of the model for the accepting country we use the analogous notation. We sub-
stitute lower-case letters for capital letters and capital letters for blackboard bold ones, i.e. 
the level of technology in the accepting country will be denoted as Kt, the nominal interest 
factor between t and t+1 as Rt+1. 
2.3. Accessing economy before and after
Both economies know both initial conditions and when the accession takes place, i.e. 
accessT  is given. They can solve their respective maximization problem as all informa-
tion is available to everyone. After the accession, the accessing economy is adopting the 
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payment technology of the accepting country8. We define accesstk  as the level of technol-
ogy that determines the intermediation cost at each market after accession. Given that 
the accessing country’s payment technology converges to the accepting one, the gap be-
tween the payment technologies of both countries will diminish over time. The evolution 
of accesstk  will reflect the payment technology differences and will be a function of the 
levels of payment technologies in both groups of countries ( )−= Ω 1 ,access accesst t tk k K , where 
→∞≤ < = =,   ,  limaccessaccess
access access access
t t t T t t tTk k K k k k K  and kt denotes the level of capital in 
an economy that evolves independently of the accepting country because it does (did) not 
access, accesstk accounts for the payment technology (capital) in the country where the ac-
cession actually happened, and Kt is the level of capital in the accepting country9.
The intermediation cost function would be slightly modified and the ratio between cash 
and electronic consumptions after the accession, equation (26), depends on the payment 
technologies of both groups of countries and the common monetary policy, Rt = Rt. That 
implies that for given levels of payment technologies and a given monetary policy, any 
decrease in the real balances will have to be accompanied by an increase in the electronic 
goods. It also implies that the accession, that means higher level of payment technology, 
> ,accesst tk k  induces a drop in the ratio of cash to electronic payments, as implied by (27).
3. Empirical analysis
According to equation (26) and the argument at the end of section 2.3, the use of alterna-
tive means of payment in the accessing countries is a function of the monetary policy and 
the technology level in the accessing and accepting countries. We interpret ( )t tk K  as the 
level of technology achieved and the set of infrastructures developed to make payments. 
In order to empirically estimate this relationship, we take logs. Therefore, the baseline 
specification to estimate is:
 ( ) ( ) ( )= α +α − +α + ε0 1 2ln / 1 ln / ,it it it it t itm e R k K  (28)
where i is accessing country and t is time. Variables m/e, R – 1, k/K account for cash to 
electronic operations (dependent variable), nominal interest rate, and the ratio of payment 
technology level in the accessing countries to the payment technology level in the accept-
ing countries (thus no index i), respectively. The error term eit is assumed to be normally 
distributed with zero mean and variance σ², eit∼N(0,σ²). The estimation takes into account 
the possible existence of non-observable heterogeneity. From an econometric point of view, 
the estimation of the coefficients, α₀, α₁ and α₂ should take into account the structure of 
the components of the error term eit, that is, the specific effects can be treated as fixed or 
random. If the effects are independent of the explanatory variables they form part of the 
error term, which in this case will be a compound term. When there is no correlation, 
we use the random effects since it is the most efficient alternative (Arellano, Bover 1990). 
Otherwise, the fixed effect estimator is used. Hausman test is used to determine whether 
the effects are fixed or random.
8 Better payment technology of accepting countries is gradually transferred towards the accessing country through 
the process of spillovers. Technology adoption is not costly for any party.
9 An example of a convergence equation could be found in Lucas (2009).
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3.1. Data
We use panel data from the EU Eastern enlargement process (2004–2007) where Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
joined the EU in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania were proposed for a later acceptance10. 
Membership is the culmination of the integration process that starts back in 1991 for 
many of the CEECs. However, due to payment statistics availability the period analyzed 
is 1996–2009. Data on EU-15 and European Monetary Union (EMU) countries are also 
used for comparison purposes11. Data sources are Eurostat and European Central Bank. 
To eliminate size and currency effect, all variables are expressed in euros and scaled by 
population12. We use data on cash and cards to account for the ratio of cash and non-cash 
operations (dependent variable). Short term (3-months) interest rate accounts for monetary 
policy as in Rinaldi (2001), among others. 
The model suggests that the institutional environment influences payment methods’ 
decisions. As explained above, the integration process is a continuous process that has 
different phases. First, an associate agreement is signed. Second, there is the applicant pe-
riod. Third negotiations to accession start and finally accession is approved. In each phase, 
countries are supposed to implement reforms to approach EU institutional arrangements. 
Accordingly, integration variable is defined to capture the different country continuous 
evolution to become EU member, presenting an increasing relationship to EU accession. 
In particular, integration variable has the lowest values in early stages of integration process 
(associate) and the largest value when membership is granted.
The level of payment technology is proxied by two alternative variables widely used in 
the retail payment methods literature (Humphrey 2010): per capita ATM and per capita 
EFTPOS. The model suggests that the technology level in both accessing and accepting 
countries influences the payment choice in the accessing group. The ratio of ATM per 
capita (EFTPOS per capita) in the accessing economy to the average ATM per capita (EFT-
POS per capita) in the accepting countries measures the payment technology convergence. 
This ratio approaches unity when the accessing countries technology level moves towards 
the technology development of the accepting group. The benchmark case is the comparison 
between the accessing countries and the EU-15. But since there is individual information 
on EMU countries, which have done additional efforts to homogenize payments instru-
ments in the single currency and the objective of some of the CEECs is to adopt EMU, we 
consider interesting the comparison between accessing and EMU countries as well.
Since a positive relationship between economic development and electronic payment 
methods is evidenced in previous studies (Humphrey 2004), we introduce economic level, 
proxied by GDP per worker, to control for development and economic stability. Table 1 
collects the definitions of the main variables and presents some descriptive statistics.
10 The panel is unbalanced.
11 EU-15 are Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy, Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland and Sweden (in membership order). Great Britain, Denmark and Sweden are 
not part of the EMU.
12 All variables are expressed in logs.
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Table 1. Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics
Variable Accessing countries Accepting countries
Pccurrency
(per capita currency in circulation)
617.03385
(679.3817)
1249.556
(286.4857)
Pccardop
(per capita card operations)
13.9415
(20.2578)
52.5298
(4.5398)
Irate
(money market interest rate)
9.0676
(14.7708)
3.0125
(0.5011)
Pceftpos
(per capita point of sale terminals)
0.0063
(0.0068)
0.0132
(0.0037)
Pcatm
(per capita atm terminals)
0.0003
(0.0002)
0.0007
(0.0001)
Pwgdp
(per worker gdp)
17758.85 
(10457.44)
56978.71 
( 2571.081)
Note: Mean and standard deviation (in brackets) are reported.  
Source: Own calculations. Country level data from ECB (2013) and Eurostat (2013).
The two columns show the mean and the standard deviation for all accessing countries 
and for the accepting countries (EU-15), respectively. Some interesting differences arise 
between both sets of countries and all differences are statistically significant. First, per 
capita currency in circulation in the accepting countries nearly doubles that of the access-
ing ones. This preliminary relationship is in line with previous evidence (Drehmann et al. 
2002). Observing the electronic payments, accepting countries present nearly four times 
the operations processed in their accessing counterparts. Accepting countries present also 
higher per capita EFTPOS and ATM, suggesting that the payment technology is more wide-
spread and developed than in the accessing countries. We have analyzed the correlation of 
the main variables. Some pairwise correlations are very high (5 out of 21 are greater than 
60%), especially ATM and EFTPOS present a correlation of 83%. To avoid multicollinearity 
problems, we do not include both variables together. Data on country differences is avail-
able in Appendix 2 (Table A.1).
3.2. Results
Results are presented in Table 2. The first two columns refer to the benchmark comparison 
to EU-15. Columns 3 and 4 compare the accessing countries to EMU ones. Finally, the 
last two columns present the analysis with alternative variable definitions. Hausman test 
is presented at the end of the table. When the test rejects the correlation of the effects, the 
random effect estimator is used.
We introduce ATM and EFTPOS variables one at a time. Independently of the compari-
son group or the proxies used, ATM and EFTPOS, the technology level exhibits a negative 
and significant coefficient. This indicates that the larger the technology expansion to catch 
up with the accepting group, the lesser the relative use of cash, as suggested by the results 
of the model. The effect of ATM and EFTPOS on cash use has been deeply studied in pay-
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ment literature. Negative EFTPOS coefficient confirms previous evidence that developed 
and widespread point of sale terminal networks reduce cash demand and use.
Previous results on ATM, however, are more inconclusive. Some studies report a posi-
tive effect (Stix 2004) whereas others present a negative effect of ATM on cash use. Our 
results are in line with the latter (see for example Boeschoten (1992), for the Netherlands 
and Snellman et al. (2001), for several European countries). They come closer to Rinaldi 
(2001) who finds that the presence of ATM together with EFTPOS has a negative effect on 
outstanding money. These negative effects could be explained by the fact that greater ac-
cess to more technologically developed payment facilities makes people withdraw just the 
amount of cash needed for small transactions in the near future, without the need to keep 
big amounts of money in their wallet. This evidence on CEECs also agrees with Humphrey 
et al. (2001) who do not find evidence of a substitution effect between ATM and EFTPOS. 
Similarly, Markose and Loke (2003) argue that money demand functions begin to break 
down in the late 1970s as a consequence of the introduction of new technologies, such as 
EFTPOS and ATM. Further, our evidence adds to the discussion on the use of alternative 
means of payment: it does not only depends on a country’s own technological development 
but also on technology advances originated in the accepting countries, as claimed by the 
theoretical model. 
Table 2. Basic specification
(1)
EU
(2)
EU
(3)
EMU
(4)
EMU
(5)
EU
(6)
EU
Atm –0.6992***
[0.0784]
–06673***
[0.0820]
–0.6759***
[0.0812]
Eftpos –0.6549***
[0.0588]
–0.6873***
[0.0553]
–0.6919***
[0.0675]
Interest rate 0.5173***
[0.0808]
0.3476***
[0.0785]
0.5581***
[0.0823]
0.3119***
[0.0744]
Long term 0.7398*** 0.3764***
Interest rate [0.1086] [0.1143]
GDP –0.9937***
[0.2032]
–0.6405***
[0.1992]
–1.1236***
[0.2046]
–0.7281***
[0.1904]
Consumption –0.9009**
[0.1857]
–0.3809**
[0.1886]
Integration –0.2613***
[0.0849]
–0.2275***
[0.0768]
–0.3581***
[0.0884]
–0.2401***
[0.0751]
–0.3468***
[0.0802]
–0.3484***
[0.0733]
Constant 8.6753***
[1.9374]
5.2224***
[1.8825]
10.5457***
[1.9181]
6.0200***
[1.7929]
6.4645***
[1.5864]
2.3809
[1.5980]
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168
R2 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.67 0.68 0.67
Hausman test 7.19 13.99*** 7.79 13.59*** 4.48 7.67
Note: ***, **, * statistically significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively.
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The other relevant variable according to the model, the nominal interest rate, presents 
a positive and significant coefficient. In the short term agent’s reaction to a change in 
monetary policy should be to use less electronic payments and more cash when interest 
rate decreases. However, the behavior of interest rates in our sample is governed by the 
monetary policy convergence, which is part of the Treaty criterion to access the European 
Union. Initially the interest rates in CEECs displayed much higher values than the EU refer-
ence rates (ECB 2004, 2006). Thus decreasing interest rates coincide with decreasing cash to 
cards ratio. We think that this convergence effect overcomes the usual negative relationship 
between interest rates and cash use. This result maintains when long-term interest rate is 
introduced in the estimation instead.
Economic development, measured as per worker GDP (or consumption), has a nega-
tive and significant coefficient, meaning that more developed countries present lower cash 
use. This result confirms previous empirical evidence on international comparisons (Cal-
lado, Utrero 2004, 2007) and persists when a different proxy (consumption) is introduced 
(columns 5 and 6). 
As a measure of the institutional environment and evolution during the integration 
period, we introduce the integration variable. The estimated coefficient is negative and 
significant in all runs. Therefore, the prospect of becoming an EU member has a positive 
effect on card use. It can be considered as a positive shock for the reliability of the eco-
nomic and financial systems. It also confirms that the transformation of payment decisions 
started before entering the EU in 2004, as claimed in ECB reports (ECB 1999). Therefore, 
economic development, payment technology, institutional environment and its evolution 
matter in payment decisions.
3.3. Robustness analysis
We have already shown that results are invariant to alternative variable definitions and a 
different benchmark group. Here we present additional evidence to examine their robust-
ness controlling that results are not driven by omitted variables. Previous empirical pa-
pers have shown that, even with the globalization of card use, differences among countries 
could persist due to different demographic and cultural factors (Humphrey et al. 1996). 
Therefore, the positive effect of the integration process in the modernization of payment 
methods could be associated to demographic or cultural changes. To discard omitted ef-
fects, we introduce different controls on demographic and cultural habits. For this purpose 
we use Population and Social Condition statistics developed by EUROSTAT. In particular 
we control for age, education, urban population, degree of innovation and crime. Table A.2 
in Appendix 2 collects summary statistics.
Wasberg et al. (1992) show a negative relationship between card use and age. To proxy 
for age, we introduce the percentage of school-age population (up to tertiary education). 
We expect a positive relationship, the younger you are the more cash you use. Carner and 
Luckett (1992) show a positive relationship between education and card use since a low 
level of literacy and education may also be factors impinging on card use. As a measure of 
education and literacy, we introduce the percentage of college enrolments and the books 
Technological and Economic Development of Economy. 2018, 24(1): 81–107 97
published scaled by population. Kaynak and Harcar (2001) claim that card usage is more 
prevalent among urban and semi-urban areas. Traditional consumers who reside in ru-
ral areas may still prefer cash transactions. Accordingly, we use the percentage of urban 
population. Humphrey (2010) claims that more innovative societies are more willing to 
use new technologies, and therefore, new methods of payments will diffuse more rapidly. 
Innovation in society is introduced by gross expenditure on research and development to 
GDP. Humphrey et al. (1996) find that the use of non-cash payment methods is related to 
the prevalence of violent crime within countries. In consequence, we control for the level 
of criminality (total number of violent crimes by population). Results are shown in Table 3. 
Looking at the variables of interest, it can be observed that the signs and the significance 
are unaltered throughout alternative specifications, meaning that the results of our analysis 
are robust. Reviewing the control variables introduced, the coefficients are not significant. 
This suggests that when the institutional evolution is considered together with the technol-
ogy development, demographic and cultural aspects are much less important in payment 
methods decisions.
An additional issue in this context is the simultaneous relationship between cash and 
ATM (Snellman, Virén 2009). To control for this potential bias, we use Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) estimation. Although simultaneity between cash and ATM can also be 
controlled by using a simultaneous equation estimator (e.g., maximum likelihood and two- 
or three-stage least squares) our choice is based on consistency concerns. In other words, 
the above mentioned estimators are more efficient than GMM, but they are not consis-
tent since they do not eliminate unobservable heterogeneity. In contrast, GMM estimation 
implies less efficiency, but it is consistent because it eliminates unobservable heterogene-
ity. Traditionally GMM uses first-difference transformation. However, this technique has 
a weakness. It magnifies gaps in unbalanced panels (Roodman 2009). Arellano and Bover 
(1995) propose a second transformation “orthogonal deviations” that minimizes data loss 
and since lagged observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as instruments13. 
Since the sample is small, we decide to use this transformation in order to preserve sample 
size. Further, to avoid over-fitting, we collapse the instrument matrix14. Table 4 collects 
the results.
Focusing first on the diagnostic tests, Hansen’s J-statistics for all specifications are too 
small to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. Therefore the excluded 
instruments are correctly omitted from the estimated equation. Further, AR(1) and AR(2) 
test statistics for the first and second order serial correlation in the first-differenced residu-
als indicate, as required, that while we can sometimes have evidence of first order autocor-
relation, we always accept the null hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation. Look-
ing at the variables of interest, the results are very similar to those presented in Table 2. 
13 In the estimation, lagged values of cash, interest rate, GDP per worker and banking structure are introduced in 
GMM-style, while ATM and EFTPOS receive the standard treatment for endogenous variables. Further, time 
dummies are included as IV-style instruments.
14 We have chosen not to run two-step GMM due to well-known finite sample problems associated with the stan-
dard errors of two-step estimates. Indeed, two-step estimates of the model (not reported) suggest significant 
downward bias in the standard errors, even after using the Windmeijer (2005) correction.
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ATM and EFTPOS affect negatively and significantly the cash use. The institutional variable 
maintains the sign of the coefficients and although the significance level is a bit lower, it is 
still significant. Therefore, institutional variables and payment technology impact payment 
decisions, as suggested by the model, and these results are robust to endogeneity.
From the time series analysis point of view some problems may arise in the results 
found because a part of the data may be non-stationary. As a consequence, that would give 
rise to co-integration analysis and specification of an error-correction model. We perform 
a battery of panel unit root tests. Table 5 collects the results. Individual unit root process is 
rejected for card to cash, ATM, EFTPOS and GDP. For interest rates results are inconclusive 
and depend on the test performed. Therefore, we do not find evidence of non-stationarity 
in our sample.
Conclusions
We present a general equilibrium model on payment choice at retail level that allows us 
to analyze the evolution of consumers’ payments when a country enters an economic and 
monetary union. The model shows that the relative importance of cash to electronic pay-
ments will diminish with technology development. In the case of a country accessing an 
economic union, the effect will be based both on its own technology level and also on the 
one of the accepting group. After the accession, the less developed economy gradually 
adapts to the payment technology of the accepting countries reducing the gap between 
consumers’ choices among both parties.
Table 4. Robustness analysis: GMM analysis
(1) (2)
Atm –1.2614***
[0.1790]
Eftpos –1.0258***
[0.1036]
Interest rate 0.3819**
[0.1666]
0.1324
[0.1228]
Gdp 0.1050
[0.4804]
0.6726
[0.6809]
Integration –0.4384*
[0.2517]
–0.4782*
[0.2821]
Constant –1.8661
[4.2619]
–7.0521
[5.9148]
Observations 168 168
AR(1) 0.20 –0.36
AR(2) 0.26 –0.31
Hansen tests 
Overidentification
Exogeneity
6.83
–0.00
9.82
0.00
Note: ***, **, * significant at .01, .05 and .1 respectively.
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Table 5. Panel data unit root tests 
a. Cash over card use
Method Statistic P-value Cross-sections Obs
Null: Unit Root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu –3.8228 0.0001 11 132
Breitung
Null: Unit Root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin –6.1142 0.0000 12 154
ADF-Fisher Chi-Sqr 53.5760 0.0005 12 144
ADF-Choi test –1.8686 0.0308 12 144
PP-Fisher Chi-Sqr 123.395 0.000 12 156
PP-Choi test –7.3738 0.000 12 156
b. ATM
Method Statistic P-value Cross-sections Obs
Null: Unit Root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu –10.4013 0.000 8 103
Breitung 0.6387 0.7369 12 154
Null: Unit Root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin –6.7945 0.000 12 154
ADF-Fisher Chi-Sqr 92.6257 0.000 12 154
ADF-Choi Z test –3.9890 0.000 12 154
PP-Fisher Chi-Sqr 105.95 0.000 12 156
PP-Choi test –4.1928 0.000 12 156
c. EFTPOS
Method Statistic P-value Cross-sections Obs
Null: Unit Root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu –1.6607 0.048 8 103
Breitung –3.2367 0.0006 12 135
Null: Unit Root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin –8.5380 0.000 12 144
ADF-Fisher Chi-Sqr 107.134 0.000 12 144
ADF-Choi test –7.3430 0.000 12 144
PP-Fisher Chi-Sqr 95.6011 0.000 12 156
PP-Choi test –6.7482 0.000 12 156
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The implications of the model are tested in the context of the EU enlargement process. 
This extension of the EU provides data on a natural (real) experiment where the conclu-
sions of the model can be examined. Results from the econometric analysis are in line 
with the theoretical model. First, technology is the main factor driving the consumers’ 
payment choice. In particular, technology development relative to the accepting countries 
indicates that the closer the accessing payment technology to the accepting one, the lesser 
the relative use of cash. Second, when controlling for endogeneity, the interest rate is less 
relevant in explaining the ratio of cash to electronic payments. This fact clearly reinforces 
the role of technology in the analysis. Third, the integration variable that accounts for the 
institutional evolution is significant, even when endogeneity issue is considered. The insti-
tutional transformation undergone to become EU member is considered a positive shock 
for the reliability of the economic and payment methods and therefore, affects payment 
instrument choice. Our results are robust to different estimation techniques, alternative 
variable definitions, different accepting groups, the introduction of additional controls and 
non-stationarity issues. 
d. Interest rate
Method Statistic P-value Cross-sections Obs
Null: Unit Root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu –4.5956 0.000 12 144
Breitung 2.2510 0.9878 11 132
Null: Unit Root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin –0.3172 0.3755 12 144
ADF-Fisher Chi-Sqr 36.3442 0.0508 12 144
ADF-Choi test 0–2.3712 0.0089 12 144
PP-Fisher Chi-Sqr 27.8613 0.1803 11 143
PP-Choi test 2.2321 0.9872 12 156
e. GDP
Method Statistic P-value Cross-sections Obs
Null: Unit Root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu –3.0398 0.0012 12 144
Breitung 2.2873 0.9889 12 132
Null: Unit Root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin –2.6424 0.0041 12 150
ADF-Fisher Chi-Sqr 44.1657 0.0073 12 144
ADF-Choi test –2.9020 0.0019 12 144
PP-Fisher Chi-Sqr 60.9794 0.0000 11 143
PP-Choi test –3.8002 0.0001 12 156
End of Table 5
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The present study provides additional evidence on consumers’ payment instrument 
choice. The findings suggest that payment instrument use can be influenced by the inten-
sive adaptation of countries’ payment technology to relatively higher standards. Current 
results confirm the relevance of the new institutional environment and structural transfor-
mation called for by the integration into an economic union.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1. Asymptotic balanced growth path behavior
The economy can reach the balanced growth path asymptotically, as →∞,t  when all sta-
tionary variables remain constant and all non-stationary variables grow at a constant rate. 
That means that the existence of the balanced growth path requires +
→∞ →∞
= =1lim lim .t tt t
R R R  
Recall that we assumed in section 2.1.2. that 
→∞
γ =loglim ( ) 0.techno y tt
k  Then, the cutoff index 
will approach unity, 
→∞
=lim ( , ) 1,tt
s k R  see equation (24). We can rewrite equations (16) and 
(17) for the CES utility function given in the equation (22) as
 ( )
( )θ= λ
1
0
1 ,t t
t
R
c j
; (A1)
 ( )
( )θ= λ
1
1
1 .t
tc j  
(A2)
Using (A2), (12), (21) and (24) we can obtain the long run growth rate of electronic 
consumption:
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( ) ( )
θ+ + ++ θ
→∞ →∞ +
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 (A3)
The long run growth rate of cash consumption and payment to intermediary will de-
pend on the specification of γ log ( ),techno y tk  but in general it will be lower than the growth 
rate of electronic consumption. 
For example, if we set 
ω
γ =log
1( ) ,techno y t
t
k
k
 where < ω≤0 1 , we can obtain following 
for the growth rate of cash consumption:
 
( )
( )
ω
θ+ + ++
→∞ →∞ + +
− λ     λ = =       λ− λ      
1
0
1 1 11
0
1 1
1 ( , )
lim lim ,
1 ( , )
t t tt t t
t tt t tt t t
s R k cm k
m ks R k c  
(A4)
and for the long run growth rate of the payment to the intermediary:
{ } ( )
{ } ( )
ω+ + + + +ω θ+ +
→∞ →∞ + +
ω
− − − λ      λ
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1 1 1 1 1
1 1
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t t t t
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t t t t t
t
s R k s R k c
g k k
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where 
 
( )
( )
= γ∫
,
0
.
t ts R k
t tg j dj   (A6)
The goods market equilibrium (19), rewritten using (20), (21) and (A6) as:
 += + + + 1,t t t t tAk m e g k  (A7)
implies that when all growth rates remain constant, the electronic consumption must grow 
like capital. Capital grows at the same rate as output.
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Appendix 2. Individual countries statistics
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics by country
Pccurrency Pccardop irate Pceftpos Pcatm Pwgdp
Bulgaria 271.8394
(165.8255)
0.8161
(0.9768)
15.4043
(33.9884)
0.0013
(0.0019)
0.0003
(0.0003)
6553.7550
(2174.07)
Cyprus 1027.5870
(255.5085)
20.6234
(12.3847)
4.2393
(1.4311)
0.0164
(0.0081)
0.0005
(0.0002)
37230.7800
(5105.155)
Czech Rep 690.1950
(339.7713)
5.3874
(5.4033)
5.8093
(5.3341)
0.0030
(0.0023)
0.0002
(0.0001)
18018.7700
(7070.125)
Estonia 340.5366
(101.8856)
44.0839
(43.4747)
3.1450
(1.2424)
0.0077
(0.0063)
0.0005
(0.0002)
14877.3900
(6570.648)
Hungary 505.1942
(208.7554)
7.1462
(6.1967)
11.8279
(5.4665)
0.0032
(0.002)
0.0003
(0.0001)
18231.2300
(6313.556)
Latvia 382.1116
(140.0498)
15.1308
(16.833)
4.8107
(2.5643)
0.0048
(0.0036)
0.0003
(0.0002)
11415.8500
(5591.857)
Lithuania 385.1401
(219.1643)
10.0679
(10.6205)
4.1807
(2.126)
0.0047
(0.0049)
0.0002
(0.0002)
12198.0600
(5260.788)
Malta 2634.6310
(328.6598)
11.8753
(8.6201)
3.9057
(1.1995)
0.0158
(0.0055)
0.0004
(0.0001)
30218.9900
(3720.698)
Poland 339.0553
(150.2792)
5.6949
(6.0405)
11.2257
(7.3449)
0.0027
(0.0022)
0.0002
(0.0001)
15057.3500
(5115.656)
Romania 121.0684
(97.5587)
1.0480
(1.4558)
32.4464
(25.8324)
0.0013
(0.0019)
0.0002
(0.0002)
7242.7990
(4679.778)
Slovakia 389.5224
(136.2764)
5.8367
(6.37)
7.5986
(5.4226)
0.0026
(0.0019)
0.0003
(0.0001)
14849.4100
(6782.954)
Slovenia 322.8070
(69.6651)
38.9769
(15.0209)
4.2186
(1.2055)
0.0131
(0.006)
0.0006
(0.0002)
27211.8800
(6725.561)
Table A.2. Summary statistics of control variables
School-age
pop (%)
Enrolment  
(per capita)
Urban pop 
(%)
Published books 
(per capita)
Gross R&D 
to gdp
Violent crimes 
(per capita)
Bulgaria 0.1356
(0.0092)
45.7609
(3.9431)
69.3786
(1.2461)
0.0006
(0.0001)
0.5049 
(0.0302)
0.0190
(0.0027)
Cyprus 0.1795
(0.0178)
30.3208
(9.3536)
67.0064
(1.1366)
0.0013
(0.0002)
0.3279 
(0.1065)
0.0081
(0.0019)
Czech 
Republic
0.1573502
(0.0167)
38.22558
(14.382)
74.08329
(0.406)
0.001125
(0.0001)
1.271492
(0.1759)
0.0362795
(0.0029)
Estonia 0.163543
(0.0183)
57.11042
(10.3995)
70.16872
(1.4197)
0.00227
(0.0002)
0.8351777
(0.3281)
0.0369066
(0.005)
Hungary 0.1470
(0.0105)
48.1188
(16.021)
65.1351
(1.8956)
0.0010
(0.0001)
0.8560
(0.1251)
0.0451
(0.005)
Latvia 0.1642
(0.0185)
61.0283
(14.3698)
68.0786
(0.294)
0.0009
(0.0001)
0.4820
(0.1118)
0.0214
(0.0041)
Lithuania 0.1729
(0.0111)
59.1920
(19.3699)
67.0309
(0.3588)
0.0012
(0.0001)
0.6706
(0.1151)
0.0217
(0.0017)
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School-age
pop (%)
Enrolment  
(per capita)
Urban pop 
(%)
Published books 
(per capita)
Gross R&D 
to gdp
Violent crimes 
(per capita)
Malta 0.1779
(0.0155)
25.7930
(7.1028)
97.2756
(8.7483)
0.0008
(0.0002)
0.3918
(0.1594)
0.0414
(0.0037)
Poland 0.1760
(0.0218)
55.1306
(13.2785)
64.2517
(9.7713)
0.0025
(0.0076)
0.6093
(0.0501)
0.0321
(0.0048)
Romania 0.1648
(0.019)
37.3723
(17.8688)
55.1146
(1.7924)
0.0003
(0.0001)
0.4813
(0.1137)
0.0138
(0.0024)
Slovakia 0.1882
(0.0209)
35.4062
(11.9516)
56.0018
(0.7246)
0.0006
(0.0002)
0.6265
(0.1831)
0.0197
(0.0024)
Slovenia 0.1474
(0.0132)
67.0758
(15.8102)
49.3157
(1.7129)
0.0017
(0.0003)
1.4517
(0.1699)
0.0362
(0.0091)
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